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Abstract 
This paper investigates the role of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) with complex chapters 
covering intellectual property rights (IPRs) in determining the magnitude and composition of countries’ 
trade. Changes in the global IPRs environment have increasingly been negotiated within the terms of 
PTAs. Despite the proliferation of PTAs with strong IPRs standards, little attention has been paid to 
their effects on the trade of member countries. Using a carefully designed empirical framework to 
measure the effects of agreement membership on aggregate imports and exports, we find that trade 
agreements with IPRs chapters have significant impacts on members’ aggregate trade. The results are 
further broken down by income groups and the composition of sectoral trade. The findings accord with 
predicted relationships from previous research on IPRs and trade and suggest that regulatory aspects of 
trade agreements have important cross-border impacts. This possibility has been little studied to date. 
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Abstract
We study the role of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) with complex chapters covering intellectual
property rights (IPRs) in determining the magnitude and composition of countries’ trade. Changes in
the global IPRs environment have increasingly been negotiated within the terms of PTAs. Despite the
proliferation of PTAs with strong IPRs standards, little attention has been paid to their eﬀects on the
trade of member countries. Using a carefully designed empirical framework, we ﬁnd that PTAs, where
one partner is either the United States, the European Union, or the European Free Trade Assocation,
with rigorous IPRs chapters have signiﬁcant impacts on members’ aggregate trade. The results are
further broken down by income groups and the composition of sectoral trade. The ﬁndings accord with
predicted relationships from previous research on IPRs and trade and suggest that regulatory aspects of
trade agreements have important cross-border impacts. This possibility has been little studied to date.
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1 Introduction
The international framework for protecting intellectual property rights (IPRs) has evolved considerably
in recent decades, with these changes amounting to the most dramatic globalization of rights to knowledge in
history (Maskus, 2012). A systematic negotiating eﬀort, primarily led by the United States and the European
Union, has instituted signiﬁcant changes in how developing and emerging countries regulate the rights to use
industrial knowledge assets and creative works through IPRs, meaning patents, copyright and related rights,
trademarks, and related constructs. The basis of this campaign was the multilateral Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), a foundational component of the World Trade
Organization (WTO). TRIPS requires WTO member countries to provide minimum standards of protection
and coverage for comprehensive aspects of IPRs.
These WTO rules are just part of the story, however. In the period since TRIPS was ratiﬁed, the United
States, the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), and the EU increasingly have demanded even stronger
protection for IPRs in their bilateral and regional preferential trade agreements (PTAs).1 For example,
the United States has concluded PTAs with Jordan, Peru, Australia, South Korea, and other countries
that feature elevated patent protection for pharmaceuticals and chemicals, stronger regulations governing
copyrights in digital goods, and expanded penalties for trademark infringement. Thus, these agreements
generally provide far-reaching and speciﬁc coverage requirements that were not considered at the WTO.
The recently negotiated 12-country Trans-Paciﬁc Partnership (TPP) calls for yet stronger IPRs, including
rigorous rules for protecting trade secrets. Still under negotiation is the Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership, which would link IPRs standards more tightly between Europe and North America. All of this
suggests that the role of PTAs in determining how the international intellectual property environment takes
shape will expand even further.
The TRIPS Agreement has received attention in the empirical literature regarding the eﬀects of changes
in international IPRs policy on such economic outcomes as trade, FDI, and knowledge transfer. The role
of PTAs that feature strong IPRs rules has so far been neglected, however. These agreements, which have
grown steadily in number since the mid-1990s, are an important means by which IPRs policy is set at the
international level. In turn, they are a potentially signiﬁcant determinant of trade and investment patterns,
innovation activities, and other important economic outcomes. As such, they deserve systematic study,
which we initiate in this paper. Speciﬁcally, we consider the impact of national membership in PTAs with
substantive chapters governing IPRs regulation, where one partner is the US, the EU, or EFTA, on the value
1The EU negotiates trade agreements as a single entity. While EFTA members (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland)
are empowered to strike bilateral deals, they share a coordinated trade policy that favors bargaining as a single bloc. Further,
EFTA countries participate in the EU’s single market.
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and composition of member countries’ aggregate and sectoral trade.
As discussed in Section 2 below, the relationship between strengthened IPRs and the volume and compo-
sition of trade, both imports and exports, is ambiguous for numerous reasons. Put simply, rules governing
IPRs are diﬀerent from import barriers. A cut in a particular import tariﬀ is eﬀectively a reduction in trade
costs, implying higher trade. Much the same may be said about across-the-board reductions in trade taxes,
which expand trade overall even as there may be some unanticipated decreases in imports of some goods
due to product-interaction eﬀects. Tariﬀ cuts generally expose domestic ﬁrms to competition, destroying
market power. Intellectual property rights, however, create temporary monopolies in the use, including trade,
of particular technologies and goods. The exclusive rights oﬀered by patents, copyrights, and trademarks
permit rights-holders to decide where, when, and how they will produce and sell protected products and
license patented technologies and digital goods.
Because multiple and contradictory theoretical predictions about potential eﬀects of IPRs on trade,
foreign direct investment (FDI), licensing, and pricing are possible, the issue is ultimately empirical. In
this context, numerous studies, beginning with Maskus and Penubarti (1995), have analyzed the impacts on
either aggregate or broad sectoral imports, focusing mainly on simple cross-country and temporal variations
in indexes of legal patent protection. While the results of early studies, using data prior to TRIPS, were
mixed (Co, 2004; Smith, 2001), they found evidence that countries with stronger patent rights attracted
increased imports of high-technology goods, especially in emerging countries with a notable ability to absorb
and imitate international technologies. Using micro-level data on the aﬃliates of US multinational enterprises,
Branstetter and Saggi (2011) detected signiﬁcantly positive impacts of domestic patent reforms in several
emerging economies on local R&D, employment, and exports at the extensive margin.
More recent papers have focused on the eﬀects of TRIPS. Thus, Ivus (2010) found that one group of
developing countries, which were obliged by the WTO agreement to adopt stronger patent reforms than a
similar group, experienced signiﬁcantly higher import growth in high-technology products. Using a more
comprehensive sample, Delgado et al. (2013) studied the dates at which developing countries implemented
the TRIPS patent rules and discovered a signiﬁcant causal eﬀect of reforms on imports of particular patent-
intensive goods. Maskus and Yang (2016) found a signiﬁcantly positive eﬀect of patent reforms in the TRIPS
era on the growth and composition of detailed sectoral exports in both emerging and developed economies.
Thus, an evidentiary consensus is emerging around the proposition that strengthening IPRs, particularly
as associated with the TRIPS Agreement, has the eﬀect of increasing both imports and exports among
developed and middle-income emerging economies, especially in high-technology and IPRs-sensitive goods.
As noted above, however, this question has not been studied in the context of the additional strengthening of
IPRs associated with high-protection preferential trade agreements. Indeed, it is possible that these estimated
2
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WTO impacts on trade are actually some combination of outcomes from both multilateral (TRIPS) and IP-
related regional agreements. In this context, the United States, the EU, and EFTA expend considerable
negotiating and political capital to convince their trading partners within PTAs to adopt so-called “TRIPS-
Plus” standards for IPRs, arguing that doing so will expand innovation and trade. Because these entities
push far more than other nations for such rules, the IP-related agreements featuring one of them as a partner
oﬀer an important laboratory for studying their trade eﬀects.
To date, the claim that TRIPS-Plus chapters stimulate trade is based solely on qualitative analysis and
anecdotes, for there is no systematic evidence on this question. This is the analytical hole we hope to
begin ﬁlling with this paper. Speciﬁcally, we ask whether PTAs with chapters requiring IPRs standards
that exceed TRIPS expectations have some additional impact on the aggregate trade of countries, over and
above that of TRIPS. We also ask whether these eﬀects vary by countries broken down into income groups
(development levels) and industries broken down into the sensitivity with which they rely on various forms
of intellectual property protection. Following Delgado et al. (2013), we pay particular attention to trade
in pharmaceuticals, chemicals, and information and communication technologies, for these are the areas in
which protective IPRs chapters set down particularly rigorous standards. Pharmaceuticals are particularly
contentious in this context, given the potential for stronger patents to limit generic competition, thereby
raising prices and limiting access to new drugs (Chaudhuri et al., 2006; Duggan et al., 2016). The latter
eﬀect might arise in part due to endogenous decisions of drug companies to limit exports to PTA partner
markets.
Thus, our paper contributes to the emerging literature on how “behind the border” regulatory regimes
may aﬀect economic activity, including international trade. At the same time, it ﬁts into the literature on
the economic eﬀects of PTAs, which certainly can diﬀer from those of basic WTO membership. For example,
Rose (2004) asked whether membership in the WTO actually increased a member’s trade, ﬁnding evidence
that it did not and stimulating a literature contesting this result. Whether PTAs, such as NAFTA, actually
increase or decrease trade, couched in terms of trade creation or trade diversion, has long been a subject of
theoretical and empirical research (Bagwell and Staiger, 1997; Romalis, 2007; Baier and Bergstrand, 2007).
Note that traditional studies of PTAs consider reductions in trade barriers between members to be the
main policy impact of free trade agreements. These cuts are necessarily discriminatory in their treatment
of members versus non-members. Thus, they naturally focus on bilateral or within-agreement trade eﬀects,
accounting also for trade diversion from outside. When considering IPRs, however, the logic is diﬀerent in at
least one critical way, arising from the inherent spillover eﬀect created by national IPR regimes. Speciﬁcally,
when a country strengthens its IPRs as a result of provisions in a PTA, by, for example, enhancing patent
protection or bolstering its IPRs enforcement, it must extend this treatment to all WTO members. That
3
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is, it cannot discriminate in its treatment of rights-holders from PTA members versus others. Legally,
this proscription comes from TRIPS, which demands of any WTO member that its IPRs regulations must
be subject to the most-favored nation and national treatment principles. In practical terms, it makes
little sense to discriminate across the origins of applications for intellectual property protection. Thus, in
principle, rights-holders from countries not party to a PTA are aﬀected legally under the same terms as
their counterparts from member countries. This fact suggests that the eﬀects of IPRs chapters in PTAs
are spread beyond the agreements’ members de jure, though it does not preclude the possibility of de facto
discrimination, an item left for future research.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides historical background on the
development of PTAs with strong intellectual-property chapters, which we call IP-related PTAs, and gives
an overview of their scope and coverage. It also brieﬂy revisits the ambiguous theory surrounding IPRs.
Section 3 describes the empirical framework and provides estimates of the eﬀects of IP-related PTAs on
aggregate and sectoral imports and exports. Section 4 discusses some implications of the results and presents
concluding remarks.
2 Background
The nature and focus of PTAs have changed considerably in recent decades. Their traditional purview
was almost exclusively to reduce barriers to trade and expand market access between member countries. This
scope was broadened considerably in the mid-1990s, with the creation of the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) and the negotiation of multiple bilateral treaties between the European Free Trade
Association (EFTA) and individual countries, such as Estonia, Latvia, and Mexico. One primary novelty of
these trade agreements was to pay greater attention to IPRs. A decade later, the EU followed suit with its
own “new trade policy,” asking for stringent protection of patents, copyrights, geographical indications and
other elements of IPRs in its proliferating PTAs with countries in Eastern Europe and the Middle East, and,
more recently, the Caribbean and Latin America.
NAFTA was the ﬁrst multi-country, large-scale PTA that went far beyond tariﬀ-cutting to set minimum
standards, if not harmonization, in key regulatory areas, including nearly every aspect of IPRs. In the patents
area NAFTA requires, among other things, minimum patent duration, conﬁdentiality for pharmaceutical
trial data, and extensions in patent length to compensate for administrative delays in granting protection.
It also requires a minimum copyright length and stipulates what type of works must be protected, including
with various neighboring rights. NAFTA calls for protection of geographical names through an eﬀective
equivalence with trademarks and collective marks, as well as automatic recognition of internationally well-
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Figure 1: Number of IP-related trade agreements and number of countries with membership in one or more
IP-related trade agreements by year, 1990 to 2015
1A
All IP-related PTAs
1B
US IP-related PTAs
000
1
0
1
0
1
0
2
0
2
0
2
0
3
0
3
0
3
0
4
0
4
0
4
0
5
0
5
0
5
0
6
0
6
0
6
0
7
0
7
0
7
0
8
0
8
0
8
0
199019901990 199519951995 200020002000 200520052005 201020102010 201520152015
1C
EU/EFTA IP-related PTAs
Number of countries
in agreements
Number of
agreements
Source: Based on data from Dür et al. (2014)
known marks. The agreements made by the EU and EFTA have similar requirements, though they vary
in certain areas of emphasis. These agreements, and those concluded by the United States, also require
members to join various international treaties on IPRs.
The evolution of PTAs beyond their traditional scope accelerated after 2000, with subsequent agreements
reached by the United States or the EU including strong IPR provisions as a matter of negotiating priority.
To be sure, other newly created trade agreements, which do not involve those countries or regions, have
been reached by Mexico, Japan, Australia, South Korea, and Chile, among others. These PTAs also include
chapters on IPRs, though generally with less rigorous standards in key areas. Figure 1A illustrates the
persistent growth after 1993 in the number of PTAs that are “IP-related” according to the deﬁnition set
out in Dür et al. (2014) and the corresponding expansion in membership. This deﬁnition simply requires
the existence of an IPRs chapter, no matter how limited or comprehensive, to qualify. As of 2015, 50 such
agreements were in place, with 82 diﬀerent countries claiming membership in at least one of them. Figures
1B and 1C, in contrast, show the growth in IP-related PTAs involving the US, the EU, or EFTA. There were
24 such agreements by 2015, involving 70 countries.2 Owing to the high degree of standards harmonization
in IPRs, we classify the EU itself as an IP-related trade agreement in our sample.3 As noted, these PTAs
involve more extensive expectations about standards and enforcement. Thus, we focus our analysis on these
2See Appendix Table A2 for the list of US-, EU-, and EFTA-negotiated IP-related agreements and their entry-into-force years.
3Our ﬁndings are robust to the alternative, in which a country’s membership in active IP-related agreements between the EU
and another party enters it into the treatment group, but not EU membership by itself.
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Figure 2: Number of IP-related trade agreements by presence of speciﬁc provisions
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PTAs, thinking of them as a policy treatment group with respect to potential trade impacts.
It is important to note that while many diﬀerent trade agreements cover IPRs, they do not treat all
elements of intellectual property in the same way, nor do they operate with the same degree of depth. In
principle, countries joining PTAs make diﬀerent decisions about IPRs and other policies based on their
own political-economic interests. Japan and South Korea, for example, are concerned about extending
patent rights, while Australia prefers weaker standards governing copyrights. Developing countries might
be expected to place more importance on sustaining access to international technologies and information,
including the rights to diﬀuse such knowledge widely through imitation or other means. In this context, it
is perhaps surprising that these countries increasingly agree to strong IPRs chapters in PTAs, a point we
exploit in our econometric analysis. The point here is that diﬀerent countries likely negotiate agreements to
emphasize particular aspects of IPRs.
For its part, the United States places great emphasis on assuring patent and copyright protection for its
own nationals’ creative works in foreign markets and negotiates its international agreements accordingly. The
EU and EFTA do so as well but emphasize even more the protection of geographical indications, which protect
the rights to use place names in wines, spirits, and other products. Figure 2 sheds light on speciﬁc provisions
found in IP-related trade agreements reached by these entities.4 All of these PTAs speciﬁcally mention
4We combine the EU and EFTA agreements because there are far fewer of them in the data than US-partnered PTAs.
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national treatment, or non-discrimination with respect to the treatment of the intellectual property of foreign
nationals. American agreements require administrative extensions for delays in the patent approval process,
linkage rules requiring that the originators of a patented product be notiﬁed when a potential producer
of an identical product applies for marketing approval, and requirements for test data conﬁdentiality for
pharmaceuticals and chemicals. These are key components of the “TRIPS-Plus” requirements of IP-related
PTAs. The EU and EFTA have begun to demand similar rules. To be sure, there are exceptions to strong
patent scope. A small number of US-involved PTAs allow parties to except from patentability plants and
animals, surgical or therapeutic procedures, or inventions that disrupt ordre public. The EU agreements
are relatively more lenient in this regard and also tend to exempt microorganisms from patent eligibility,
reﬂecting their domestic legal systems.
With regard to copyrights, the breadth of coverage varies considerably. Most agreements stipulate mini-
mum durations for copyright (generally the author’s lifetime plus 70 years, which is in excess of the TRIPS
standard of life plus 50 years) and specify what types of works must be eligible for coverage. Inevitably, with
the rise of the digital economy, rules preventing circumvention of digital rights management and ending gov-
ernment use of illegally-acquired software have become major concerns. In trademarks, the vast majority of
these PTAs require the protection of geographical indications in some fashion, with the EU and EFTA being
particularly strict in this area, and recognition of well-known marks. Finally, with regard to enforcement,
US-brokered agreements require both criminal and civil penalties for infringement, special border customs
measures for dealing with infringing material, injunctive relief, and establishment of within-PTA enforcement
administrations or committees. Again, these provisions exceed TRIPS standards. Recent EU agreements
have begun to take on similar provisions. All told, there is an increasingly broad scope of IP-related agree-
ments covering a comprehensive range of often controversial issues. This trend suggests that both domestic
and foreign rights-holders in countries that are party to US-, EU-, or EFTA-partnered PTAs operate under
IPRs regimes that are notably more stringent than those of countries unconnected to such agreements.
Within this complex framework it is worth reconsidering how IPRs, which may seem only indirectly re-
lated to comparative advantage, might importantly aﬀect countries’ trade. Even at the simplest level the an-
ticipated eﬀects of IPRs policy revisions are theoretically ambiguous. As discussed by Maskus and Penubarti
(1995), stronger domestic protection of intellectual property creates several cross-cutting eﬀects. First, the
market-expansion eﬀect would increase imports if foreign rights-holders can more easily safeguard their in-
tellectual property, aﬀording them a larger eﬀective market size. This should especially be the case in those
sectors most reliant on IPRs. Second, the market-power eﬀect from strengthened IPRs might lead to rights-
holders engaging in monopolistic behavior, restricting sales and raising prices in destination markets. Third,
a cost-reduction eﬀect could emerge as ﬁrms ﬁnd it less necessary to disguise the technical aspects of their
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products or become more willing to ship advanced-technology inputs. Note that such eﬀects could reduce
both the variable and ﬁxed costs of exporting to particular markets, with a potential increase in both the
intensive and extensive margins of trade.
Next, the impacts of patent reforms could interact with ﬁrms’ choice of modes with which they serve
foreign markets. Again, stronger patents, trade secrets and trademarks could lower the ﬁxed costs of entering
a market via local production, whether due to reduced legal costs or a more favorable bargaining position
with local intermediate suppliers. This should raise the relative level of inward FDI and technology licensing
in the market, perhaps at the expense of imports (Vishwasrao, 1994; Nicholson, 2007). Nonetheless, it is
possible for both imports and inward FDI to increase as the destination country’s market becomes more
attractive due to stronger IPRs.
These scenarios refer to reasons why IPRs reforms in destination markets could alter the exports of
goods from technology-leading nations to both similar countries and emerging economies. It is also possible
for domestic policy changes to aﬀect exports of local ﬁrms. On the one hand, the technology access im-
plicit in greater imports can build domestic capacities through adoption, adaptation, and learning spillovers,
eventually leading to technology-oriented exports (Branstetter and Saggi, 2011; He and Maskus, 2012). On
the other, stronger IPRs potentially limit the ability of local ﬁrms to imitate and copy technologies, dimin-
ishing their possibilities for exporting domestic versions of advanced or even lower-technology goods. In
another vein, stronger patent rights may either incentivize more innovation on the part of domestic ﬁrms or
raise the costs of follow-on R&D. Available evidence is mixed on this point, though it suggests innovation
in emerging countries may be enhanced subject to certain threshold eﬀects in education and competition
(Chen and Puttitanum, 2005; Qian, 2007).
There remains the question of why PTAs with strong IPRs chapters may exert an additional inﬂuence,
positive or negative, on the imports and exports of member nations. To some degree the answer is simply
that such agreements increase IPRs protection above the global baseline of TRIPS, so that any primary trade
eﬀects could be magniﬁed. Also important, however, are potential interactions of IPRs with the market-size
impacts of PTAs. By establishing larger areas within which both trade is liberalized and key elements of
intellectual property protection are enhanced, IP-related PTAs could have a dual impact on trade within
the region. This eﬀect should arise particularly in goods that intensively rely on various forms of IPRs, a
hypothesis we test statistically and for which we ﬁnd considerable evidence.
Our analysis in this paper addresses just the ﬁrst stage of many interesting and relevant questions that
could be posed. For example, are there particular interactions between trade and FDI ﬂows within IP-related
PTAs? Do such PTAs generate additional channels of learning that induce export growth within or outside
the region? Are tendencies toward trade diversion associated with discriminatory tariﬀ cuts oﬀset by the
8
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non-discrimination inherent in IPRs, or does this depend on the sector? We leave such questions to later
research.
3 Empirical Framework and Estimation Results
Given the extensive changes in national IPRs policy wrought by bilateral and multilateral trade agree-
ments, and the potential mechanisms outlined above through which such reforms could aﬀect trade ﬂows,
our objective in the empirical analysis is to uncover what eﬀects membership in IP-related trade agreements
has had on countries’ aggregate imports and exports.5 To do this we adopt a treatment-control econometric
framework, where we ﬁrst compare separately countries’ aggregate imports or exports across two sectors: an
IP-intensive group of commodities (High-IP), and a group of products classiﬁed as less reliant on IPRs (Low-
IP). We take our deﬁnition of IP-intensive and less IP-intensive commodities from Delgado et al. (2013). They
classify the traded commodity codes in the Standard International Trade Classiﬁcation (SITC), Revision 3,
into high-IP or low-IP sectoral classiﬁcations based on a similar categorization of the Standard Industrial
Classiﬁcation (SIC) codes in the Economics and Statistics Association of the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Oﬃce’s 2012 report on intellectual property.6 Finally, because the eﬀects of changes in IPRs regimes might
vary by countries’ comparative development levels, we later allow for any eﬀect of membership in IP-related
trade agreements to vary by income groups.
As detailed in Section 2, IP-related PTAs cover multiple aspects of IPRs and vary in their speciﬁc
regulatory provisions. Therefore, to add depth to the empirical analysis we later break down the sectoral
classiﬁcation. First we classify goods according to the mode of IPRs (patents, copyrights, and trademarks)
on which they may rely intensively. Second, we consider speciﬁc high-IP industry clusters as noted below.
Table 1 presents the characteristics of “treatment” vs. “control” countries. Here the treatment group is
deﬁned as the set of countries that will at some point in the sample period enter into an IP-related PTA.
These ﬁgures are broken down by income groups at the beginning (1993), middle (2003), and end (2013) of
the period. Immediately apparent is that the groups are not identical. The treatment high-income countries
tend to be larger in GDP than their control counterparts, a ranking that reverses for middle-income and
low-income country groups. Treatment nations have somewhat higher per-capita GDP levels in all groupings.
The high-income treatment countries undertake more of both high-IP and low-IP imports and exports. The
5In later research we intend to examine the role of IPRs in bilateral trade linkages, as in Smith (2001) or Co (2004). Certainly
if an origin or destination country in a bilateral pair bolsters its protection of IPRs via the provisions of a PTA, bilateral
trade between them could be aﬀected. It would also be of interest to study whether IPRs rules in PTAs generate marginal
changes in trade creation or trade diversion. At this point, we rely on the MFN principle embedded in these PTAs and focus
on aggregate trade impacts.
6For a full listing of the industrial classiﬁcation and associated SITC Rev. 3 commodities codes, see Appendix Table A3. For
details on the original U.S. Patent and Trademark Oﬃce industrial classiﬁcation, see U.S. Department of Commerce (2012),
available at http://www.uspto.gov/.
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Table 1: Characteristics of treatment versus control countries by income group and year
1993 2003 2013
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Income Group Treatment Control Treatment Control Treatment Control
High 727.89 474.51 1,052.30 376.59 1,636.96 675.36
(1,467.07) (1,385.04) (2,331.77) (1,181.09) (3,378.45) (1,595.52)
GDP Middle 50.34 72.64 61.78 64.71 155.51 265.40
(105.97) (106.69) (128.72) (114.60) (263.43) (520.33)
Low 2.62 60.52 4.73 62.26 6.92 316.64
(1.22) (132.89) (3.73) (262.07) (5.56) (1,498.35)
High 20,571.15 18,603.84 32,461.52 25,983.84 51,520.60 51,854.88
(6,868.57) (7,676.10) (11,509.67) (6,838.76) (22,448.86) (22,053.99)
GDP per capita Middle 3,598.25 2,895.88 6,219.88 2,718.08 12,353.19 7,295.70
(2,376.82) (2,051.31) (4,159.31) (1,906.50) (6,434.21) (5,046.33)
Low 524.60 390.14 1,071.16 553.87 2,761.92 1,829.24
(183.74) (162.37) (136.19) (411.10) (1,382.25) (1,769.89)
High 3.41 2.93 4.35 4.03 4.41 4.03
(0.88) (0.66) (0.37) (0.44) (0.36) (0.44)
Ginarte and Middle 1.52 1.63 3.21 2.76 3.77 3.16
Park Index (0.71) (0.66) (0.70) (0.66) (0.47) (0.50)
Low 0.92 1.72 1.97 2.26 2.38 2.83
(0.47) (0.55) (0.69) (0.49) (1.01) (0.51)
High 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.85 1.00 0.78
TRIPS (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.38) (0.00) (0.44)
Middle 0.00 0.00 0.97 0.47 1.00 0.63
(0.00) (0.00) (0.16) (0.50) (0.00) (0.49)
Low 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.27 1.00 0.39
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.45) (0.00) (0.49)
High 45.44 14.58 87.32 23.21 139.27 56.27
(54.44) (26.22) (113.95) (50.36) (178.89) (95.78)
High-IP imports Middle 3.85 5.98 8.33 6.77 22.19 22.37
(6.99) (7.46) (17.36) (11.71) (37.40) (35.37)
Low 0.40 4.79 0.74 6.71 1.21 20.36
(0.16) (12.78) (0.54) (35.72) (0.89) (94.10)
High 19.06 10.60 27.19 9.39 53.66 23.71
(21.63) (22.40) (33.63) (21.82) (61.89) (44.49)
Low-IP imports Middle 1.57 2.19 2.90 2.06 8.93 9.32
(2.31) (2.64) (4.79) (2.89) (12.25) (13.63)
Low 0.15 2.87 0.26 2.11 0.52 9.02
(0.04) (7.28) (0.16) (8.46) (0.42) (34.76)
High 46.91 27.24 88.58 32.70 150.34 65.87
(58.12) (62.33) (103.88) (79.69) (181.46) (121.28)
High-IP exports Middle 1.81 3.67 5.49 5.15 16.24 11.94
(4.76) (6.39) (13.18) (11.86) (29.94) (21.64)
Low 0.03 2.66 0.07 5.23 0.43 27.55
(0.02) (8.66) (0.05) (30.71) (0.58) (149.73)
High 17.88 6.42 23.42 5.79 49.28 13.71
(16.00) (11.68) (23.04) (11.78) (50.60) (24.25)
Low-IP exports Middle 1.95 3.74 2.89 3.46 9.35 11.42
(2.44) (4.90) (4.16) (5.84) (12.75) (19.37)
Low 0.25 3.62 0.38 3.33 1.20 14.99
(0.11) (8.20) (0.16) (14.82) (1.23) (67.80)
Notes: Each entry reports the average and (in parentheses) standard deviation for a given variable by treatment and income group
for the respective sample year. GDP, imports and exports are measured in current billion USD, and GDP per capita in current USD.
For data sources, see Appendix Table A1.
1 The value for each sample year portays the most recently calculated version of the Ginarte and Park index for each country. Since
the index is not calculated for every country, the reported values only pertain to sample countries with existing values for the index.
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picture is more nuanced at other income levels, but one noteworthy ﬁnding is that treated middle-income
countries saw considerably larger growth in high-IP exports than the corresponding control countries.
Two other variables are listed in the table. First, to get a sense of the legal protection of patents in each
country group we list statistics for the Ginarte-Park (GP) index of patent-law provisions, which we discuss
further below. This index was ﬁrst developed in Ginarte and Park (1997), with later updates. Interestingly,
middle-income treatment countries on average have a lower value of the GP index at the start of the sample
period, suggesting that the countries that enter into an IP-related FTA had weaker patent rights than their
counterparts early on, a diﬀerence that accords with earlier descriptions (Maskus, 2012). Within this group,
however, the treatment countries saw relatively greater increases in this index. Second, we deﬁne a variable
capturing adherence with TRIPS. This is a binary variable taking a value of 1 for countries which are in
compliance with TRIPS in a given year and 0 otherwise. TRIPS compliance rates between the two groups
diﬀer throughout the period, with higher compliance rates for treatment countries. Countries identifying as
least-developed received an exemption from complying with TRIPS until 2013; thus, our TRIPS variable is
zero for countries classiﬁed as least-developed.
From the table it is diﬃcult to decipher whether the (economy size-adjusted) gap between treatment and
control countries in IP-intensive imports and exports has grown. Even more diﬃcult is assessing whether
it has grown more than the corresponding gap in low-IP imports and exports and how much of any such
growth may be attributed to the creation of IP-related PTAs over the period. Figure 3 provides a preliminary
indication as to whether an eﬀect exists, speciﬁcally for middle-income countries, which have been the subject
of greatest concern about IPR infringements and, therefore, a central target of TRIPS-Plus chapters in
PTAs. It shows the average (log) exports and imports of high-IP and low-IP goods over the sample period.
The middle-income control countries experienced a dip early in the period in all goods types before seeing
expanding trade after around 2003. In contrast, the treatment nations saw steady increases in both imports
and exports of both types of goods, which became sustainably higher than trade by the control countries
later in the period. Moreover, there appears to be some divergence in trends in the trade of high-IP exports
and imports in favor of the treatment countries, which hints that some sort of eﬀect is at play. Whether
this eﬀect is attributable to the IPRs provisions of PTAs, or rather to some concurrent and perhaps more
important policy shift (e.g., TRIPS) is the empirical question to be addressed.
Our identiﬁcation relies on two types of variation. First, during our sample some countries entered into
IP-related trade agreements, as we deﬁne them below, while others did not (note that countries rarely exit
PTAs once they have joined). Second, there are important economic diﬀerences across similar countries that
also diﬀer in their membership in IP-related PTAs. A challenge to this identiﬁcation strategy arises if the
causality between trade and IPRs works in two directions. On the one hand, IP-related PTAs might increase
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Figure 3: Average (log) high-IP and low-IP imports and exports of middle-income treatment vs. control
countries, 1993 to 2013
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members’ trade over and above TRIPS, the basic eﬀect we seek to identify. On the other hand, member
nations may form such agreements because they already undertake a relatively high level of trade in high-IP
goods.
While this is a potential concern, the threat of an endogenous relationship between high-IP trade and
the formation of high-IP PTAs is limited by a critical factor in how such agreements arise. The primary
purpose of PTAs is to liberalize within-agreement trade through cuts in border taxes and other trade barriers.
Where strong IPRs chapters are included it is typically at the insistence of a single negotiating party. This
is especially the case where IP-related PTAs involve both technologically advanced countries that have a
strong comparative advantage in creating IP-intensive goods and developing or emerging countries that
produce relatively little intellectual property. Indeed, this situation accurately characterizes the bulk of the
IP-related PTAs in our sample, with one partner being the United States, EFTA, or the EU. Moreover,
these developed partners typically bring greater bargaining power to the negotiating table. Thus, it is highly
likely that low-income and middle-income countries that join PTAs with higher-income countries primarily
agree to signiﬁcantly stronger IPRs rules in order to obtain greater and more secure access to major foreign
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markets.7 Put diﬀerently, for such countries IPRs are second-order negotiating concessions that they would
not ordinarily select as a matter of endogenous policy.8 While this factor does not ensure that the IPRs
eﬀect we examine is necessarily exogenous to countries’ trade, it is reasonable to expect that, at least for
low-income and middle-income countries, the policy is eﬀectively randomly assigned. We now turn to the
estimation of our relationships of interest.
Aggregate imports and exports of high-IP goods
Equation (1) describes the baseline regression approach, which is estimated separately for aggregate
imports and aggregate exports:
log (TRist) = β1 log (GDPit) + β2High-IPs × log (GDPit) + β3IPAit + β4High-IPs × IPAit (1)
+ β5TRIPSit + β6High-IPs × TRIPSit + αgst + αi + εist
The dependent variable, log (TRist), represents country i’s aggregate imports or exports in sector s (high-IP
or low-IP in the baseline speciﬁcation) in year t. To capture the continual introduction of IP-related FTAs
that has occured in recent decades as well as contemporaneous changes in IPR policy at the international level,
the sample period covers the years 1993 to 2013.9 Because of the positive relationship between economic
size and trade volume, we include log (GDPit), country i’s GDP in year t. We also allow for the trade
elasticity with respect to size to vary across sectors via the inclusion of High-IPs× log (GDPit). We obtain
our data on countries’ yearly trade ﬂows and national income levels from, respectively, UN Comtrade (2016)
and World Bank (2016).10
Our key variable is designed to incorporate cross-country diﬀerences in accession to IP-related trade
agreements. For this purpose, we introduce the variable IPAit (for IP-related agreement), which takes a
value of 0 for the years in which country i is not party to an IP-related PTA (which has entered into force)
with the US, EU, or EFTA, and 1 for each year in which they are party to at least one such agreement. With
respect to the time dimension, most IPRs chapters in these agreements require speciﬁc compliance dates,
upon or soon after the date of a treaty’s entry into force. In this context the binary nature of this policy
variable is appropriate. In the baseline speciﬁcation IPAit is interacted with High-IPs. Our estimation thus
7This can readily be true for rich countries as well. Canada, for example, has objected to many of the patent and copyright
provisions in TPP, while Australia’s negotiators expressed reservations about elements of pharmaceuticals protection in their
FTA with the United States (Maskus, 2012).
8A similar argument about developing countries taking on TRIPS obligations as an exogenous policy change within the broader
market opportunities of the WTO is central to the identiﬁcation in Delgado et al. (2013).
9The beginning of this interval precedes the ratiﬁcation of the ﬁrst IP-related PTAs, such as NAFTA, as well as the introduction
of TRIPS and countries’ subsequent compliance decisions. Furthermore, the interval extends suﬃciently forward in time to
incorporate even the most recent IP-related PTAs.
10For a full list of data descriptions and sources, see Appendix Table A1.
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yields the coeﬃcients of greatest interest: β3, the diﬀerence in low-IP trade for IP-related PTA members
compared to those not party to such an agreement, and β3 + β4, capturing the corresponding diﬀerence in
high-IP imports or high-IP exports.
Recalling that our central question is whether IP-related PTAs have an impact on trade beyond what
would be driven by multilateral IPRs reforms, each speciﬁcation contains an analogous set of controls for
each country’s compliance with the TRIPS agreement. Note that accession to and compliance with TRIPS
are generally not the same. This is because the WTO pact gave developing countries certain transition
periods within which to come into TRIPS compliance after ratifying the agreement itself (Deere, 2009).
Thus, we estimate the date of TRIPS compliance using the methodology employed by Delgado et al. (2013),
based on Ginarte and Park (1997), Park (2008), and Hamdan-Livramento (2009). High-income countries
generally implemented TRIPS in 1995 (with some exceptions, such as Portugal and Iceland, which attained
compliance in 1996), while middle-income countries were generally granted extended deadlines through 2000
or later. The least-developed countries were given exemptions which eﬀectively delayed their mandatory
TRIPS compliance past 2013. Similarly, numerous low-income economies had not come into compliance
by that date. Thus, we model these countries as not having adhered to TRIPS for the duration of our
sample. These TRIPS-related controls and interactions allow us to separate the variation in aggregate trade
attributable to IP-related PTAs from that attributable to TRIPS compliance.
Finally, we control for unobservable factors that may aﬀect aggregate trade volumes and may be correlated
with our IPA policy variable. First, we account for idiosyncratic variables that may exist across country
development levels, IPRs intensity of goods, and time by including group-sector-year ﬁxed eﬀects αgst. Note
that the deﬁnition of sector or commodity type s will vary with the particular speciﬁcation, as discussed below.
We also incorporate country ﬁxed eﬀects αi to account for any time-invariant country-speciﬁc unobservable
variables.
Both logic and empirical results from the literature suggest that the eﬀects of IPRs on trade are likely
to vary across levels of economic development, which we proxy here with our selection of three income
groups. Thus, in our second speciﬁcation we consider whether the eﬀects of membership in IP-related PTAs,
as well as TRIPS compliance, are heterogeneous across income levels in addition to sectoral dependence
on IPRs. To deﬁne income groups we take the World Bank’s classiﬁcation of economies as low-income,
middle-income (which includes both lower-middle and upper-middle), and high-income. It is important to
ﬁx each country’s income group in the sample to avoid the possibility that IPRs-related changes in economic
activity endogenously change these selections over time. Therefore, for the econometric analysis, we assign
each country to a single income group for the entire 21-year sample based on their income classiﬁcation
in 1995, near the the beginning point of the sample. Interacting the relevant policy variables to allow for
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income-group heterogeneity yields equation (2), where Groupi indexes country i’s income group:
log (TRist) = β1 log (GDPit) + β2High-IPs × log (GDPit) (2)
+ β3IPAit +
∑
g
β4gGroupi × IPAit +
∑
g
β5gGroupi ×High-IPs × IPAit
+ β6TRIPSit +
∑
g
β7gGroupi × TRIPSit +
∑
g
β8gGroupi ×High-IPs × TRIPSit
+ αgst + αi + εist
Equation (2) diﬀers from equation (1) in that the main eﬀects of IPA and TRIPS and the High-IPs
policy interactions now vary with income group. Speciﬁcally, high-income, middle-income, and low-income
countries are permitted to have diﬀerent eﬀects of membership in IP-related trade agreements. Thus, note
that β4g represents the direct eﬀect of the IPA variable for income group g and β5g captures the high-IP
interaction eﬀect with the policy treatment IPA. Coeﬃcients β7g and β8g represent the corresponding eﬀects
of TRIPS compliance.11
We report the regression results for equation (1) and equation (2) for aggregate imports in Table 2, both
with and without country ﬁxed eﬀects. Robust standard errors are clustered by country. Clearly market
size, given by GDP of the importer, matters greatly for trade. It is interesting that there is a signiﬁcantly
positive interaction of GDP with our indicator for high-IP goods, suggesting that such imports are more
elastic with respect to total demand than are low-IP imports. We see some evidence of a positive direct
eﬀect of IPR-related PTA membership on trade in column (1), but the interaction coeﬃcient is insigniﬁcant.
However, controlling for country-speciﬁc factors in column (2) the direct impact of IPA disappears.
Permitting diﬀerent eﬀects across income groups in columns (3) and (4), however, generates interesting
ﬁndings. Focusing on the most rigorous case in column (4), we ﬁnd little direct eﬀect of IPA but negative
and signiﬁcant interaction eﬀects between IPA and low-income status. It appears from these coeﬃcients
that when such countries join an IP-related PTA it tends to diminish imports of products that are less
dependent on IPRs. However, there is a positive impact in high-IP goods in the triple interaction for the
low-income groupings, with this coeﬃcient being larger in absolute magnitude than that of the interaction
between low-income and IPA. Thus, while the estimated direct eﬀect on low-IP imports are negative in these
countries, the impact on high-IP goods is actually positive, consonant with recent research. In contrast, for
middle-income economies there is no evidence of an impact of IP-related PTAs on imports of either low-IP
or high-IP manufacturing goods.
11To avoid the interactions Groupi ×IPAit and Groupi ×TRIPSit spanning the same linear space as the main policy variables
IPAit and TRIPSit, we omit the ﬁrst interactions for high-income countries from the regression analysis.
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Notice next that the coeﬃcients on the direct eﬀects of TRIPS are positive but insigniﬁcant. However,
there are signiﬁcantly negative interactions in column (4) for both middle-income and low-income economies,
suggesting that TRIPS has diminished trade in low-IP sectors, controlling for the existence of IP-related
PTAs. Here, this negative eﬀect is largely oﬀset by the positive interaction for high-IP goods in middle-
income countries, suggesting that the conditionally negative outcome of TRIPS is much smaller for such
products in emerging economies. To summarize, this initial evidence suggests that both TRIPS and IP-
related PTAs diminish low-IP imports in developing countries, but the eﬀect is considerably attenuated or
even positive in high-IP industries.
Table 3 presents the results for the aggregate export regressions. Here GDP refers to output in the
exporter, making it a capacity variable. Again, it has strong impacts on trade in both types of goods, with a
signiﬁcantly higher capacity elasticity for high-IP sectors. The coeﬃcients in column (2) suggest that exports
of low-IP commodities are somewhat diminished by IPA but this is more than oﬀset by the positive impact
on IPRs-intensive goods. Breaking the result down into income groups in column (4), however, reveals
that it is middle-income countries that experience these eﬀects most signiﬁcantly. The main eﬀect in the
Middle-inc.× IPA interaction is negative but insigniﬁcant. However, the signiﬁcantly positive estimate on
Middle-inc.×High-IP × IPA reveals that such economies that are party to IP-related PTAs on average
exhibit 56 percent higher exports in IP-intensive commodities than in low-IP commodities. If the eﬀects
on IPA and Middle-inc.× IPA are indeed zero, this interaction constitutes a sizable diﬀerence in high-IP
exports between middle-income countries that are in IP-related PTAs compared to those that are not. In
contrast, there is evidence of a negative impact of such membership on the high-IP exports of low-income
countries. Thus, IP-related PTAs with the US, EU, and EFTA seem to bolster imports and reduce exports
of high-IP goods in lower-income economies while raising such exports in middle-income economies. This
result is novel in this literature.
The diﬀerence in these results with the eﬀects of TRIPS in Table 3 is striking. The TRIPS compliance
interaction is strongly negative for both the middle-income and low-income countries, suggesting that it is
repressing exports of lower-IP goods. However, the triple-interaction coeﬃcients are positive for both goods
(signiﬁcantly so for the middle-income group), implying that the negative eﬀect of TRIPS on exports is
smaller in the high-IP sectors in developing countries. There also is evidence of a negative eﬀect on high-IP
exports from developed economies.
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Table 2: Aggregate imports of IP-intensive commodities
Homogeneous Eﬀects Heterogeneous Eﬀects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS Country FEs OLS Country FEs
log (GDP) 0.836*** 0.736*** 0.838*** 0.736***
(0.0180) (0.0600) (0.0183) (0.0594)
High-IP× log (GDP) 0.0966*** 0.0966*** 0.0923*** 0.0923***
(0.0122) (0.0123) (0.0115) (0.0117)
IPA 0.265*** -0.0681 0.250 -0.0937
(0.0968) (0.0539) (0.180) (0.0901)
High-IP×IPA -0.0105 0.0228
(0.0526) (0.0529)
Middle-inc.×IPA 0.0724 0.111
(0.199) (0.111)
Low-inc.×IPA -0.458** -0.470**
(0.211) (0.210)
High-inc.×High-IP×IPA 0.0367 0.0367
(0.120) (0.122)
Middle-inc.×High-IP×IPA -0.105 -0.105
(0.0669) (0.0679)
Low-inc.×High-IP×IPA 0.660*** 0.660***
(0.102) (0.103)
TRIPS 0.154** -0.0616 0.217 0.122
(0.0716) (0.0527) (0.337) (0.108)
High-IP×TRIPS 0.156 0.0569
(0.122) (0.0700)
Middle-inc.×TRIPS -0.223 -0.327**
(0.364) (0.134)
Low-inc.×TRIPS -0.0554 -0.286*
(0.356) (0.152)
High-inc.×High-IP×TRIPS -0.114 -0.114
(0.143) (0.145)
Middle-inc.×High-IP×TRIPS 0.292*** 0.292***
(0.0530) (0.0538)
Low-inc.×High-IP×TRIPS 0.142 0.142
(0.0945) (0.0959)
Number of countries 185 185 185 185
Observations 6,176 6,176 6,176 6,176
R2 0.941 0.981 0.941 0.981
Income group-sector-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE No Yes No Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by country are reported in parentheses. The omitted IPA
and TRIPS dummies in columns (3) and (4) are High-inc.×IPA and High-inc.×TRIPS. *** p < 0.01,
** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 3: Aggregate exports of IP-intensive commodities
Homogeneous Eﬀects Heterogeneous Eﬀects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS Country FEs OLS Country FEs
log (GDP) 1.024*** 0.425*** 1.030*** 0.448***
(0.0438) (0.133) (0.0443) (0.134)
High-IP× log (GDP) 0.229*** 0.228*** 0.218*** 0.219***
(0.0642) (0.0660) (0.0628) (0.0646)
IPA 0.356* -0.191* 0.413 -0.208
(0.182) (0.113) (0.407) (0.238)
High-IP×IPA 0.330* 0.326*
(0.181) (0.188)
Middle-inc.×IPA -0.282 -0.129
(0.438) (0.285)
Low-inc.×IPA 0.602 0.382
(0.478) (0.356)
High-inc.×High-IP×IPA 0.390 0.387
(0.457) (0.464)
Middle-inc.×High-IP×IPA 0.564*** 0.561***
(0.207) (0.211)
Low-inc.×High-IP×IPA -0.605* -0.610*
(0.365) (0.367)
TRIPS 0.784*** -0.191** 1.178 0.374
(0.196) (0.0823) (0.714) (0.313)
High-IP×TRIPS 0.0907 0.319
(0.299) (0.199)
Middle-inc.×TRIPS -0.639 -0.825**
(0.759) (0.381)
Low-inc.×TRIPS -0.724 -0.870**
(0.784) (0.415)
High-inc.×High-IP×TRIPS -1.070* -1.074*
(0.577) (0.587)
Middle-inc.×High-IP×TRIPS 0.687* 0.700*
(0.396) (0.408)
Low-inc.×High-IP×TRIPS 0.552 0.602
(0.344) (0.372)
Number of countries 186 186 186 186
Observations 6,139 6,139 6,139 6,139
R2 0.819 0.918 0.821 0.919
Income group-sector-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE No Yes No Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by country are reported in parentheses. The omitted IPA
and TRIPS dummies in columns (3) and (4) are High-inc.×IPA and High-inc.×TRIPS. *** p <
0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Imports and exports of high-IP goods by mode of IPRs-intensiveness
As previously discussed, a critical feature of existing IP-related trade agreements is the breadth of their
coverage across diﬀerent forms of intellectual property rights. Notably, IPRs chapters generally cover pro-
visions pertaining to patents, copyrights and related rights, and trademarks. The fact that many of the
agreements considered here include requirements in all three areas implies that any policy eﬀects might,
in reality, diﬀer across sectoral lines. We now examine heterogeneous sectoral eﬀects as deﬁned by the
nature of IPR-intensiveness of industries, referring to the type of IPRs on which certain commodities are
particularly reliant. Equation (3) describes the regression framework with which we can test the hypothesis
that treatment eﬀects vary not only across income groups and high-IP versus low-IP sectoral composi-
tion, but also across diﬀerent modes of IPRs-intensity. The variable Types denotes whether an industry
is patent-intensive, copyright-intensive, or trademark-intensive (denoted, respectively, High-pat., High-CR,
and High-TM in the regression tables). These sectoral deﬁnitions are taken from Delgado et al. (2013) based
on U.S. Department of Commerce (2012).
log (TRist) = β1 log (GDPit) +
∑
s
β2sTypes × log (GDPit) (3)
+ β3IPAit +
∑
g
β4gGroupi × IPAit +
∑
g
∑
s
β5gsGroupi × Types × IPAit
+ β6TRIPSit +
∑
g
β7gGroupi × TRIPSit +
∑
g
∑
s
β8gsGroupi × Types × TRIPSit
+ αgst + αi + εist
Consider the comparative charts in Figure 4, which paints a similar picture as Figure 3, but now for
imports and exports of goods broken down by type of IPRs sensitivity. In all cases, the smoothed growth
path of exports overtakes that of imports around 1998. Beyond that time the diﬀerences seem to become
ampliﬁed, especially in exports, as IP-related PTAs have formed over time. Again, however, it is diﬃcult to
observe any clear breakpoints between the eﬀects in the treatment versus control countries.
Turning to the regression results in Tables 4 and 5 we can analyze whether any diﬀerences can be at
least partially attributed to IP-related trade agreements. Note carefully that each table reports the results
from a single regression, wherein each column reports the coeﬃcients for the relevant sectoral interactions.
For instance, column (2) of Table 4 reports the coeﬃcient estimates on the High-pat. interactions for IPA
membership and with TRIPS compliance for the regression of log (imports) on the full set of main eﬀects,
income group-sector interactions, and ﬁxed eﬀects. Thus, each table represents a single regression that is an
expanded version of column (4) in Tables 2 and 3, with the additional sectoral breakdown generating larger
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Figure 4: Average imports by type of IP-intensiveness middle-income treatment vs. control countries, 1993
to 2013
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sample sizes. With this expanded speciﬁcation, we now see a negative primary eﬀect of IPA membership
on low-IP imports (“Control”) in column (1). However, this eﬀect varies sharply between middle-income
countries, where the overall direct IPA impact is positive, and low-income countries, where the interaction
term accentuates the negative outcome. Perhaps surprisingly, the coeﬃcient in column (3) on High-CR×
log (GDP ) for imports is signiﬁcant and negative, suggesting that imports of copyright-intensive goods are
somewhat less responsive to market size than are low-IP products.12
Considering the breakdown of IPA eﬀects by mode of IPRs-intensity, some interesting eﬀects surface.
Consistent with our earlier high-IP result, we ﬁnd evidence that patent-intensive imports increase signiﬁcantly
in low-income countries that join IP-related PTAs, while the triple-interaction coeﬃcient in middle-income
economies remains negative. Imports of both copyright-intensive and trademark-intensive goods increase in
high-income partners of IPA-related PTAs. This is true also in lower-income countries, suggesting that the
stimulus to high-IP imports noted in Table 2 carries over to all types of goods embodying high intellectual
12This result may be an artefact of the small number of copyright-intensive sectors in the data, as noted in the Appendix.
Indeed, the vast majority of copyright-protected trade comes in cross-border services provision, such as internet transactions,
that are not measured in Comtrade data.
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Table 4: Aggregate imports by type of IP-intensiveness (single regression)
Block
Control High pat. High CR High TM
log (GDP ) 0.771***
(0.0615)
Type× log (GDP) 0.112*** -0.0974*** 0.0486***
(0.0123) (0.0225) (0.0124)
IPA -0.286**
(0.122)
Middle-inc.×IPA 0.348**
(0.141)
Low-inc.×IPA -0.412*
(0.222)
High-inc.×Type×IPA -0.0565 0.500** 0.414***
(0.127) (0.209) (0.150)
Middle-inc.×Type×IPA -0.137* -0.112 0.0427
(0.0711) (0.124) (0.0710)
Low-inc.×Type×IPA 0.654*** 0.824*** 0.731***
(0.121) (0.123) (0.0892)
TRIPS 0.188
(0.183)
Middle-inc.×TRIPS -0.472**
(0.202)
Low-inc.×TRIPS -0.379*
(0.221)
High-inc.×Type×TRIPS -0.0209 -0.349 -0.114
(0.127) (0.496) (0.162)
Middle-inc.×Type×TRIPS 0.336*** 0.497*** 0.175***
(0.0586) (0.147) (0.0601)
Low-inc.×Type×TRIPS 0.119 0.0536 0.273***
(0.105) (0.158) (0.0914)
Observations 12,335 12,335 12,335 12,335
R2 0.973 0.973 0.973 0.973
Income group-sector-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by country are reported in parentheses. The
omitted IPA and TRIPS dummies are High-inc.×IPA and High-inc.×TRIPS. Reported
coeﬃciencts are estimated from a single regression of aggregate imports on the set of
controls in equation (3). *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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property content. Thus, our results again suggest that IPRs-sensitive imports are most stimulated by these
agreements when the partner is a lower-income developing economy. For their part, the TRIPS coeﬃcients
suggest a direct diminution of imports of control (low-IP) goods in both middle-income and lower-income
groups. However, the interaction coeﬃcients between TRIPS compliance and IPRs types are signiﬁcantly
positive for the former group in patent-sensitive and copyright-sensitive industries, again suggesting that any
reduction in manufacturing imports associated with TRIPS is far smaller in such goods. This is true also for
lower-income countries in trademark goods. Thus, prior ﬁndings in the literature that TRIPS has boosted
imports of high-technology goods into developing countries in fact may reﬂect the combined inﬂuence of the
WTO agreement and various IP-related PTAs, according to our results.
Table 5 contains results for the export regressions and unearths some key diﬀerences. There is a strongly
positive export response in copyright-intensive goods among high-income countries. Moreover, middle-income
IPA members exhibit signiﬁcantly higher exports of all three goods types, with coeﬃcients on the relevant
interactions ranging from 0.61 to 0.85. In this context, the evident stimulus of such agreements to high-
IP exports is comprehensively spread across industry types in emerging economies. Again, we ﬁnd little
evidence of any impacts of such agreements on high-IP exports in low-income countries. Turning to the
TRIPS agreement, it again shows evidence of reducing exports of low-IP goods in both middle-income
and low-income countries (column (1)), with these eﬀects oﬀset somewhat by positive coeﬃcients on the
triple interactions in patent-intensive and, especially, trademark-intensive goods. Regarding trademarks,
much of this eﬀect may be attributable to those countries’ exports of footwear and apparel, which are
trademark-intensive in the classiﬁcation. Another explanation may be that multinational ﬁrms specializing
in trademark-intensive products may be more likely to locate foreign production facilities in PTA partner
countries with stronger protection for trademarks through their IPRs chapters. The TRIPS eﬀects on exports
are negative in all three goods types for high-income economies.
Aggregate imports and exports of high-IP industry clusters
The analysis in the previous section demonstrates how the eﬀects of IP-related PTAs membership inter-
act with income groups and modes of IP-intensity. It is also interesting to examine the details of how such
agreements may aﬀect trade in more speciﬁc industrial sectors that are particularly sensitive to IPRs. Many
IPRs provisions, such as test-data conﬁdentiality, linkage rules for chemicals and pharmaceuticals, and anti-
circumvention of digital copyrights, pertain closely to speciﬁc products and sectors. Other IPRs-intensive
industries might not be the focus of speciﬁc standards, but nonetheless could be aﬀected diﬀerently. In the
next analysis, Sectors denotes IPRs-intensive industry clusters as deﬁned in Delgado et al. (2013), based on
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Table 5: Aggregate exports by type of IP-intensiveness (single regression)
Block
Control High Pat High CR High TM
log (GDP ) 0.304***
(0.145)
Type× log (GDP) 0.216*** 0.132** 0.351***
(0.0638) (0.0614) (0.0690)
IPA -0.523
(0.324)
Middle-inc.×IPA 0.00847
(0.371)
Low-inc.×IPA 0.680
(0.460)
High-inc.×Type×IPA 0.546 0.997** 0.582
(0.471) (0.394) (0.562)
Middle-inc.×Type×IPA 0.608*** 0.847*** 0.638***
(0.222) (0.284) (0.222)
Low-inc.×Type×IPA -0.673 0.178 -0.0723
(0.413) (0.450) (0.421)
TRIPS 1.053**
(0.473)
Middle-inc.×TRIPS -1.586***
(0.533)
Low-inc.×TRIPS -1.740***
(0.578)
High-inc.×Type×TRIPS -1.121** -1.628** -1.456*
(0.561) (0.761) (0.807)
Middle-inc.×Type×TRIPS 0.645* 0.489 0.849**
(0.363) (0.366) (0.408)
Low-inc.×Type×TRIPS 0.504 0.0127 0.778*
(0.376) (0.418) (0.420)
Observations 12,090 12,090 12,090 12,090
R2 0.915 0.915 0.915 0.915
Income group-sector-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by country are reported in parentheses. The
omitted IPA and TRIPS dummies are High-inc.×IPA and High-inc.×TRIPS. Reported
coeﬃciencts are estimated from a single regression of aggregate exports on the set of
controls in equation (3). *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Figure 5: Average imports by sector of middle-income treatment vs. control countries, 1993 to 2013
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Porter (2003) and U.S. Department of Commerce (2012). Our high-IP industries now are the ones identiﬁed
as being most reliant on IPRs, and include analytical instruments (AI), biopharmaceuticals (BIO), chemi-
cals (CHEM), information and communications technology (ICT), medical devices (MED), and production
technology (PT). A graphical breakdown in Figures 5 and 6 of importing and exporting trends over time
reveals patterns similar to those observed in Figure 3 and Figure 4. In a number of cases, however, such
as exports of biopharmaceuticals and chemicals, visual inspection suggests a particular turn upward of the
treatment group during the period.
Analogous to equation (3), equation (4) describes the relationship between aggregate imports or exports
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Figure 6: Average exports by sector of middle-income treatment vs. control countries, 1993 to 2013
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and the main eﬀects and interactions for both IPA and TRIPS:
log (TRist) = β1 log (GDPit) +
∑
s
β2sSectors × log (GDPit) (4)
+ β3IPAit +
∑
g
β4gGroupi × IPAit +
∑
g
∑
s
β5gsGroupi × Sectors × IPAit
+ β6TRIPSit +
∑
g
β7gGroupi × TRIPSit +
∑
g
∑
s
β8gsGroupi × Sectors × TRIPSit
+ αgst + αi + εist
The regression results for equation (4) in Tables 6 and 7 show the diﬀerent sectoral impacts of IPA
membership on imports and exports, respectively. Again, these are results from a single regression in
each table, with columns displaying the coeﬃcient estimates for the given sector. The coeﬃcients on
High-inc.×Sector× IPA are generally insigniﬁcant regarding imports, with the particular exception of bio-
pharmaceuticals. Exports in this sector are also highly responsive to membership of high-income economies
in IPA-related PTAs. In this context, it appears that such trade agreements oﬀer a stronger market within
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which to sell medicines and other biological products and generate growth in two-way trade. This is inter-
esting in light of the focus of many IP-related PTAs on patent and test-data provisions speciﬁcally related
to pharmaceuticals. There also appear to be positive export eﬀects among such countries in medical devices
and production technologies. In contrast, there are no eﬀects on ICT trade among high-income economies.
Interaction estimates for imports among the middle-income countries’ are generally negative and insignif-
icant, though there are detectable reductions in imports of chemicals and production technologies. On
the other hand, the corresponding export coeﬃcients are almost uniformly positive and highly signiﬁcant.
Within that group we ﬁnd that exports are encouraged by IP-related PTAs in AI, BIO, ICT, MED, and PT.
Thus, we again ﬁnd that imports are marginally negative aﬀected by this form of trade policy, while exports
are highly responsive in middle-income countries. This ﬁnding accords with prior results in the literature on
emerging economies and IPRs in high-technology goods (Maskus and Yang, 2016). However, the result here
suggests that it is membership in IP-related PTAs that drives this outcome. For their part, the low-income
economies register generally positive and signiﬁcant impacts in imports across the high-IP clusters, again at-
testing to the role of such agreements in expanding imports of biopharmaceuticals, medical devices,and other
high-technology goods. In contrast, the impacts are generally negative for exports in these sectors among
the low-income countries. The exception is biopharmaceuticals, which are increased by PTA membership.
This outcome may reﬂect regional growth in exports of medicines produced in packaging facilities in this
industry after the formation of IPR-related PTAs. Overall, these various results suggest that IPR-related
PTAs have complex but marked impacts on trade in high-IP goods among member countries, with imports
into poor economies generally expanded and exports from middle-income economies strongly increased.
Table 6 demonstrates that the direct eﬀects of TRIPS compliance are negative on imports of low-IP
goods in both groups of developing nations (column (1)). However, the triple-interaction coeﬃcients are
positive and signiﬁcant among these high-IP clusters in middle-income countries, again suggesting that
TRIPS diminishes any reduction in trade in such goods. In Table 7 we ﬁnd broadly similar impacts on
exports in both country groups. In any event, our results suggest that IPR-related PTAs have noticeably
stronger eﬀects on the trade of developing countries than does TRIPS. Put another way, we ﬁnd consistent
evidence that PTAs are an important determinant of IPRs-induced trade patterns, even after controlling
for contemporaneous TRIPS implementation. This conclusion oﬀers useful supplemental perspective to the
recent empirical literature.
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Table 6: Aggregate imports by IP-intensive industry cluster (single regression)
Block
Control AI BIO CHEM ICT MED PT
log (GDP ) 0.669***
(0.0716)
Sector× log (GDP) 0.277*** 0.0745** 0.266*** 0.143*** 0.152*** 0.199***
(0.0208) (0.0315) (0.0216) (0.0197) (0.0198) (0.0176)
IPA -0.213
(0.160)
Middle-inc.×IPA 0.206
(0.175)
Low-inc.×IPA -0.400*
(0.229)
High-inc.×Sector×IPA -0.0185 0.729*** 0.228 -0.212 0.195 -0.0968
(0.182) (0.251) (0.209) (0.187) (0.160) (0.212)
Middle-inc.×Sector×IPA -0.0934 0.0874 -0.143* -0.111 -0.0471 -0.166**
(0.0988) (0.122) (0.0843) (0.146) (0.0781) (0.0696)
Low-inc.×Sector×IPA 0.342* 1.354*** 0.353** 0.466*** 0.807*** 0.157
(0.177) (0.200) (0.147) (0.0922) (0.153) (0.207)
TRIPS 0.374
(0.240)
Middle-inc.×TRIPS -0.716***
(0.264)
Low-inc.×TRIPS -0.612**
(0.279)
High-inc.×Sector×TRIPS -0.0119 -0.0812 -0.285 -0.126 -0.170 -0.366
(0.304) (0.464) (0.448) (0.323) (0.247) (0.230)
Middle-inc.×Sector×TRIPS 0.398*** 0.364** 0.437*** 0.566*** 0.234* 0.206**
(0.143) (0.167) (0.123) (0.107) (0.128) (0.0904)
Low-inc.×Sector×TRIPS 0.322* -0.0498 0.270** 0.172 -0.0367 0.204*
(0.166) (0.195) (0.122) (0.127) (0.203) (0.123)
Observations 21,414 21,414 21,414 21,414 21,414 21,414 21,414
R2 0.959 0.959 0.959 0.959 0.959 0.959 0.959
Income group-sector-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by country are reported in parentheses. The omitted IPA and TRIPS dummies are
High-inc.×IPA and High-inc.×TRIPS.. Reported coeﬃcients are estimated from a single regression of aggregate imports
on the set of controls in equation (4). Coeﬃcient on log(GDP) is suppressed from reported estimates. *** p < 0.01,
** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 7: Aggregate exports by IP-intensive industry cluster (single regression)
Block
Control AI BIO CHEM ICT MED PT
log (GDP ) 0.313**
(0.140)
Sector× log (GDP) 0.300*** 0.380*** 0.486*** 0.300*** 0.399*** 0.251***
(0.0690) (0.0721) (0.0807) (0.0893) (0.0633) (0.0556)
IPA -0.716
(0.455)
Middle-inc.×IPA -0.149
(0.517)
Low-inc.×IPA 1.341**
(0.576)
High-inc.×Sector×IPA 0.858 2.144*** 0.901 0.154 0.959* 0.965*
(0.565) (0.641) (0.652) (0.625) (0.539) (0.489)
Middle-inc.×Sector×IPA 1.013*** 1.229*** 0.401 1.089*** 1.150*** 1.037***
(0.359) (0.356) (0.254) (0.399) (0.346) (0.259)
Low-inc.×Sector×IPA -1.493*** 1.090** -1.250* 0.955 -0.756** -1.370***
(0.342) (0.519) (0.752) (0.858) (0.300) (0.351)
TRIPS 1.069*
(0.574)
Middle-inc.×TRIPS -1.633***
(0.623)
Low-inc.×TRIPS -1.547**
(0.665)
High-inc.×Sector×TRIPS -0.638 -1.333* -1.173 -0.758 -1.555** -1.291*
(0.721) (0.787) (0.807) (0.746) (0.784) (0.663)
Middle-inc.×Sector×TRIPS 0.746** 0.0252 0.803** 0.788 0.424 0.439
(0.365) (0.360) (0.393) (0.489) (0.401) (0.347)
Low-inc.×Sector×TRIPS 0.312 0.387 0.360 0.665* 0.469 0.457
(0.410) (0.491) (0.538) (0.351) (0.406) (0.370)
Observations 20,253 20,253 20,253 20,253 20,253 20,253 20,253
R2 0.891 0.891 0.891 0.891 0.891 0.891 0.891
Income group-sector-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by country are reported in parentheses. The omitted IPA and TRIPS dummies are
High-inc.×IPA and High-inc.×TRIPS.. Reported coeﬃciencts are estimated from a single regression of aggregate exports on
the set of controls in equation (4). Coeﬃcient on log(GDP) is suppressed from reported estimates. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05,
* p < 0.1.
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4 Conclusion
IPRs provisions in preferential trade agreements have proliferated since their inception in the 1990s. The
extent to which these provisions have inﬂuenced member countries’ trade has gone unstudied before this
paper. Our results point out that ignoring the role of IP-related PTAs in the international intellectual
property system fails to consider a critical channel through which countries eﬀect changes in their policy
regimes. Our empirical analysis reveals that IP-related trade agreements have signiﬁcant eﬀects on countries’
aggregate trade. While these eﬀects are most often found in middle-income developing countries, they
characterize particular sectors in high-income and low-income countries as well. In brief, IP-related PTAs
are also “trade-related” in signiﬁcant ways. Moreover, these eﬀects seem to dominate those coming simply
from adherence to TRIPS, the multilateral framework for protecting intellectual property rights.
The analysis here could be extended in several potentially rewarding ways. The aggregate nature of the
trade data surely masks important and interesting phenomena that could be found in sectoral and bilateral
trade. For example, to what extent do the estimated eﬀects represent increased trade of ﬁnal goods versus
intermediates as global supply chains respond to changes in relative institutional environments? It would
also be useful to study the eﬀects on bilateral trade, both within and outside the treatment PTAs, to see if
IPRs provisions exert a separate eﬀect on trade creation or trade diversion. The most important extension
would be to investigate the channels through which IPRs chapters may aﬀect measured trade. It is possible
that IP-related PTAs have similar impacts on within-region FDI, which could supplement our ﬁndings. More
fundamentally, it may be that IPRs provisions interact with investment rules, services liberalization, or other
regulatory issues implicated by PTAs. Indeed, there may be complementary eﬀects between tariﬀ cuts and
IPRs standards in driving high-technology trade. Ultimately, the new breed of regulation-intensive PTAs
seems to be an important determinant of international policy environments, opening up wide vistas for
further research.
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Appendix
Table A1: Data sources and description
Variable Description Data Source
Trade Aggregate trade ﬂows in current USD by SITC
Rev. 3 code, 1993-2013
UN Comtrade (2016)
Ginarte and
Park index
Measure of national patent regime strength Ginarte and Park (1997); Park
(2008)
GDP GDP in current USD by country World Bank (2016)
GDP per capita GDP per capita in current USD by country World Bank (2016)
Income groups Yearly income group classiﬁcations by GDP per
capita
World Bank (2016)
IPA Accession to IP-related free trade agreements by
country and year of accession
Dür et al. (2014)
TRIPS TRIPS compliance dates by country Ginarte and Park (1997); Park
(2008); Hamdan-Livramento
(2009)
High-IP IP-intensive commodities by SITC Rev. 3 code Delgado et al. (2013) based on
U.S. Department of Commerce
(2012)
Sector Low-IP control and IP-intensive sectoral clusters
by SITC Rev. 3 code
Delgado et al. (2013) based on
Porter (2003);
U.S. Department of Commerce
(2012)
Type Classiﬁcation of high-IP commodities by type of
IP in which good is intensive (patents vs.
copyrights vs. trademarks)
Delgado et al. (2013);
U.S. Department of Commerce
(2012)
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Table A2: US, EU, and EFTA IP-related preferential trade agreements and entry-into-force years
Agreement Entry-into-force year
Australia-USA 2005
Bahrain-USA 2006
Bulgaria-EFTA 1993
CARIFORUM-EU 2008
Central American Free Trade Agreement 2006
Chile-USA 2004
Colombia-EFTA 2011
Colombia-USA 2012
EU-Macedonia 2001
EU-Turkey 1996
EFTA-Estonia 1996
EFTA-Latvia 2006
EFTA-Mexico 2001
EFTA-Slovenia 1995
European Free Trade Association (Services) 2001
European Union Varies by member
Jordan-USA 2001
Morocco-USA 2006
North American Free Trade Agreement 1994
Oman-USA 2009
Panama-USA 2012
Peru-USA 2009
Singapore-USA 2004
South Korea-USA 2012
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Table A3: Sectoral deﬁnitions and associated SITC Rev. 3 codes and code descriptions
High-IP sectors by mode of IP-intensiveness
High-patent
Crude fertilizers: 277, 278 Metalworking machinery: 73
Organic and inorganic chemicals: 51, 52 General machinery: 7413-9, 7421-3, 7427, 743-9
Dyeing materials: 53 Oﬃce machines: 75
Medicinal and pharmaceutical products: 54 Telecommunications: 76
Essential oils and perfume materials: 55 Electrical machinery: 77
Chemical materials and products: 59 Professional apparatus: 87
Rubber manufactures: 6214, 625, 6291-2 Photographic apparatus: 881-2, 884, 8853-4
Power-generating machinery: 71 Miscellaneous manufacturing: 8931, 893332, 8939,
Industrial machinery: 721-3, 7243, 7248, 725-8 8941-3, 8947, 8952, 89591, 897-9, 8991-6
High-trademark
Dairy products and beverages: 022-4, 111, 1123 Manufactures of metal: 66494, 69561-2, 69564,
Crude rubber: 231-2 6966, 6973
Pulp and waste paper: 251 Road vehicles: 784, 78531, 78536
Plastics: 57, 5813-7, 582-3 Furniture: 82
Paper and related articles: 64 Footwear: 85
High-copyright
Cinematographic ﬁlm: 883 Printed matter & recorded media: 892, 8986-7
High-IP sectors
Analytical Instruments (AI) Medical Devices (Med)
Laboratory instruments: 87325, 8742-3 Diagnostic substrances: 54192-3, 59867-9
Optical instruments: 8714, 8744 Medical equipment and supplies: 59895, 6291, 774
Process instruments: 8745-6, 8749 872, 8841
Biopharmaceuticals (Bio) Production Technology (PT)
Medicinal and pharmaceutical products: 5411-6, Materials and tools: 2772, 2782, 69561-2, 69564
54199, 542 Process and metalworking machinery: 711, 7248,
Chemicals (Chem) 726, 7284-5, 73
Chemically-based ingredients: 5513, 5922, 5972, 59899 General industrial machinery:
Dyeing and package chemicals: 531-2, 55421, 5977 7413, 7417-9, 7427, 7431, 74359, 74361-2,
Organic chemicals: 5124, 5137, 5139, 5145-6, 5148, 5156 74367-9, 7438-9, 7441, 7444-7, 74481, 7449
Information and Communications Technology (ICT) 7452-3, 74562-3, 74565-8, 74591, 74595-7,
Communications equipment: 7641, 76425, 7643, 76481, 746-7, 7482-3, 7486, 7492-9
7649, 77882-4
Computers and peripherals: 752, 75997
Oﬃce machines: 7511-2, 7519, 75991-5
Electrical and electronic components: 5985, 7722-3,
7731, 7763-8, 77882-4
Low IP sectors
Animal and vegetable oils, fats, and waxes: 41-3 Manufactures of leather, cork and wood, minerals, or
Food and live animals: 01, 03, 041-5, 05, 061, 071-2, metal: 61, 63, 6511-4, 652, 654-9, 661-2, 6633, 6639
074-5, 08 6641-5, 6648-9, 67, 6821-6, 68271, 683, 6841, 68421-6,
Inedible crude materials (except fuels): 21, 22, 244, 685-9, 6911-2, 69243-4, 6932-5, 694, 6975, 699
261-5, 289-9, 273, 28, 292-7, 29292-3, 29297-9 Miscellaneous: Prefabricated buildings (811-2), travel
Lubricants, mineral fuels, and related materials: 32-4 goods (83), and apparel and accessories (84)
Notes: From Delgado et al. (2013), based on U.S. Department of Commerce (2012).
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